Beyond Interpretation A Reply to Jerzy Stelmach

There are three goals of the essays. First, an attempt at clarifying the concept of interpretation is made. It is argued that the only reasonable way of reconstructing interpretation as an activity is to look at the products of interpretation. From this point of view interpretation should be seen as a process that leads to narrowing down the so called meaning bundle of a given expression, i.e. the set of possible meanings prima facie ascribable to the interpreted expression. Second, two theses of Jerzy Stelmach – that interpretation cannot be objective and that interpretation has no a priori limits – are critically analyzed against the conceptual backdrop proposed in the fi rst part of the essay and rejected. Finally – third – a thesis is defended that interpretation plays no central or essential role in legal reasoning. It is argued that the goal of legal reasoning can best be described as a positive exemplifi cation and resolution of the norm confl icts. Neither of these procedures may serve the process of interpretation, i.e. the narrowing down the meaning bundles of interpreted expressions

.

Załączniki:
Pobierz plik (4-2011 Brożek.pdf)4-2011 Brożek.pdf155 kB
UJ logo logo Utriusque Iuris

Programy

W latach 2019–2020 czasopismo wydawane jest w ramach programu „Wsparcie dla czasopism naukowych” Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego.

Czasopismo jest ujęte w bazie European Reference Index for Humanities and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS) oraz w bazie HeinOnline.

Kontakt

Ten adres pocztowy jest chroniony przed spamowaniem. Aby go zobaczyć, konieczne jest włączenie w przeglądarce obsługi JavaScript. 

© Forum Prawnicze 2022
Wykonanie: Solmedia.pl