Positivist Myths of Legal Method
The paper aims at identifying several methodological myths embraced by legal
positivism. The first such myth is the claim that legal cognition has a logical
structure; the second is the myth of the formal-dogmatic method; the third is
that of Kelsen’s normative method; and the fourth and final is the myth of legal
analysis, or the faith in the fruitfulness of linguistic analysis. All these myths
can – and should – be ‘deconstructed’ by observing that legal positivism offers
no coherent epistemology, but rather a number of common sense directives; that
the strength of the argument supporting the myths is minimal; that the methods
of positivism are ineffective in legal practice; and that there exists an alternative
to the positivist methodology – a conception of legal method based on epistemological
pluralism and relativism.

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