The problem addressed in this paper is of the crucial difference between justice and revenge. Following the vivid images of revenge and justice present in literature, I argue that revenge is rooted in a reactive, backward-looking spirit which is destructive for both individuals and the community. Justice, on the other hand, is rooted in an active, forward-looking spirit which is constructive and aimed at restoring order. I analyze the different functions of punishment which are based on payback and are thus focused on the balance of power and status which is more typical for revenge than justice. Retribution should be based on a normative balance rooted in norms and values, and which is aimed at promoting accountability. Anger transformed by justice should be focused on wrongdoing (the act), rather than the wrongdoer (person). Justice in its highest degree, when complemented by mercy, becomes ‘ justice as generosity’ which is able to restore trust in social relations, fostering solidarity and reconciliation in society.

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Soniewicka 3-19.pdf

354 kB

For what was obvious yesterday is not necessarily obvious today, i.e., to the present generation of young citizens. In the past, freedom of religion for all has always been an important element of constitutional guarantees, but one wonders whether religious freedom would be defended by the present younger generation. In particular, would the young of Europe defend it? The answer, unfortunately, is most probably in the negative. But maybe the United States is different—is indeed our Euro-Atlantic world divided on the issue of religion and its role in modern societies? Legal history teaches that freedom of religion always comes at a price. The crucial point is who has to pay the price. Freedom cannot defend itself. It needs its own witnesses, martyrs and, above all, guardians and protectors. Recently, that is during the last two terms, the Supreme Court of the United States has sent out a series of instructive and influential signals that protection of religion should be strengthened. The relevant cases are American Legion v. American Humanist Association (2019), Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020), Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania (2020), Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021).

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FLB.pdf

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Leonardo Polo enriches legal philosophy with the concept of ‘person’, one whose act of being means co-being, co-existence, and which allows the person to grasp his or her act of being through encounter with others—being ‘ademas’. This concept might suggest anthropological reflection on individual rights, which are usually conceived as the autonomous sphere of a person as one who can act according to his or her own act of will, and in this way by the exercise of rights can be self-determined. The idea of the person as being-ever-more (‘ademas’) opens us to the idea of the correlation of our entitlements and of our capacity towards others—which means that we may understand both our entitlements and our capacity only when we encounter others—in dialogue or at the court—by recognizing the constraints upon us of others’ entitlements and capacities.

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Blicharz.pdf

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This paper will examine constitutional utopianism in the specific case of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Given that utopianism in constitutionmaking is inevitable, some constitutionalists place an emphasis on pragmatic utopianism as the acceptable approach towards constitutional utopia. Also, it is stated that the consistency of constitutional values and principles, mostly derived from constitutionalism, is a necessary element for a possible constitutional utopia. Based on this theoretical framework, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is examined as a case study. It is demonstrated that, instead of one constitutional utopia, we can find three inconsistent utopias intertwined in a single constitutional text: a constitutional utopia based on Western Constitutionalism, an Islamic utopia and a leftist utopia. Through examples taken from the preamble and articles of the Constitution, the inconsistency of these utopian worlds is demonstrated. Finally it is concluded that Iranian Constitution of 1979, and its amendments in 1989, may be categorized as failed constitutional utopianism.

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Vakilian.pdf

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Directive 2019/1 provides for a harmonisation of important procedural aspects related to the enforcement of competition law by National Competition Authorities. The power to set priorities, stipulated in art 4 of ECN+ Directive, is one of particular practical implications for both NCAs as well as undertakings concerned. This power allows NCAs to reject a complaint lodged by a complainant due to the lack of sufficient interests in pursuing an investigation. Such right is strongly intertwined with the procedural rights granted to complainants. While the current legal framework for setting priorities and safeguarding complainant’s rights diverge significantly among Member States, a minimum legal standard should be guaranteed in order to ensure coherent model of applying EU competition law within European Competition Network. In order to protect and enhance the process of lodging complaints, such prioritisation has to be counterbalanced by rights granted to complainants and obligations imposed on the Institutions. In this regard, similar legal frameworks and established requirements should exist in national law as the obligations imposed on the Commission. In particular, NCAs and national legislators should learn lessons from the mistakes committed by the Commission which were verified by the European Courts. The importance of providing a proper statement of reasons and obligation not to omit relevant evidence shall be remember and properly implemented by NCAs. At the end of the day the goal is to cause that the rejection of complaint would not be a mere formality.

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Kaminski.pdf

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On 22 October 2020, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has declared provisions admitting eugenic abortion unconstitutional (case sign. K 1/20). Tribunal stated that the said provisions that sanction eugenic practices in relation to the unborn child deny respect and protection of human dignity (Art. 30) and the principle of legal protection of the life of every human being (Art. 38). Tribunal has not referred to another objection indicated in the MPs’ motion that making the protection of unborn child’s right to life dependent on its health status was tantamount to illegal direct discrimination (Art 32). Nevertheless, it seems noteworthy to underline that a negative assessment of a disease, handicap, or disability is not legally tantamount to a negative assessment of the affected human beings, their dignity and the value of their life. Human life valued so highly on normative grounds, regardless of the person’s health condition, means that the life of a conceived child with malformations should be protected under penal law to the same extent as the life of a conceived and properly developing child. The admissibility of selective abortion based on the health status of the foetus must be recognized as unacceptable, just as abortion based on gender, race or social origin of the child.

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Cieply.pdf

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Leonard Lessius was one of the most accomplished philosophers of the Salamanca School whose great contribution to the study of law lies in the use of economic analysis to study legal institutes. The book, which is the subject to the present review, gives account of his scientific achievements. Among many other questions tackled by Lessius, the review discusses the evolution of the pacta sunt servanda principle, the morality and legality of interest, price mechanism, competition as well as the economic aspects of the salvation of one’s soul. Attention is also paid to influence of Lessius on contemporary and later authors and timelessness of some of his theories.

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Dvorsky.pdf

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