Załączniki:
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Polish obligations and guarantees
for UEFA EURO 2012 in the field of IPR’s
and related matters

UEFA EURO 2012 is an unique event in the country’s history, but it is also an excellent
advertisement product. Poland and Ukraine, upon submitting their candidacy
for organising UEFA EURO 2012, have undertaken to take all necessary actions
in order to protect intellectual property rights referring to UEFA EURO 2012TM
such as: “EURO 2012”.
The guarantees cover legal protection of word marks and logos connected with
the tournament, counteracting unfair marketing practices, prohibited practices
related to ticket sale and unlicensed public broadcasting of tournaments.
The aim of this study is to answer the question whether Poland – co-host of the
European Football Championship in 2012 is able to provide appropriate protection
of the UEFA intellectual property rights, according to commitments made
during candidates phase. Does the Polish legislation ensure full protection of the
UEFA Intellectual Property Rights – such prestigious event?
Essentially, there is also the question of the legal nature of guarantees submitted
by Poland. Discussion of their impact on the bodies of the Polish administration,
undertaken primarily to protect the financial and organizational effort of UEFA
and official sponsors.
The article presents regularity and identification of possible improvements which
are to be introduced in this area before and during the UEFA EURO 2012TM in order
to prevent using by unauthorized persons of the UEFA EURO 2012 marks and
symbols, including ambush marketing practices.

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The concept of a crisis situation
under the Act of 26 April 2007
on crisis management

The term “crisis situation”, often used in the literature, wasn’t a legal term until the
Act of 26 April 2007 on crisis management has been passed. In the original text of
the act the crisis situation was understood as a situation which is a consequence
of the threat and thus leads to breaking or considerable violation of the social ties
and simultaneously to the serious disturbance in the functioning of public institutions
to such extent that the means necessary to safeguard or restore security
do not justify the introduction of any of the extraordinary measures referred to
in Article 228 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. However the above
definition was abolished by the Constitutional Tribunal and changed by the Act of
17 July 2009. At present, the crisis situation means a situation that impacts negatively
on the safety of people, property of large sizes or the environment, producing
significant restrictions on the operation of the competent authorities of public
administration due to the inadequacy of the possessed capabilities and resources.

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Extensive interpretation
This essay discusses the issue of a broadening interpretation in the light of legal
practice and study of the language. Speaking about the broadening interpretation,
the term “interpretation” refers to the result of interpreting an expression. To label
the outcome as a result of broadening interpretation, one has to compare it with
another outcome – the scope of reference. Claims commonly formulated in legal
literature suggest that the scope of reference for broadening interpretation derives
from the “pure language” and does not require deeper consideration or implications.
On the other hand, broadening interpretation, according to the definitions,
expands the meaning of the text beyond its language and is associated with
inferences which may be drawn from purposes or other indicators of the legislator’s
intention. This essay presents the construction of broadening interpretation,
which more closely corresponds to the legal practice. The goal of the essay is to
show that broadening interpretation does not completely distort the language
in which the legal text was formulated. Both the scope of reference and the wider
scope (the extensive interpretation) are inevitably linked to the implications and
inferences based on the legal text’s language and can vary basically in the range
of permissible conclusions that can prove wider in the case of broadening interpretation
and as to the result which is obviously wider in the case of extensive
interpretation. The implications we find in, and draw from, the legal text’s language
are influenced by our tendency to attribute purpose to whatever we read.

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Parallels between Roman Civil Law
and English Common Law as exemplified
by the Rules that govern Litigation
and Obligations

The paper starts with the presentation of factors that probably stand behind
analogies between the Roman Civil Law and the English Common Law (1). These
factors concern the framework of the sources of law – the dominance of case-law,
the dogma of unalterable good-old law (2). Then the text presents the phenomenon
of domination of procedural rules over the substantive ones. Even the English
legal historians, although reluctant to concede that Romanisation also took
place in Albion, admit that to a certain degree “their” original writs and forms of
action in common law functioned similarly to the formulary system of the Roman
law (3). A number of parallels was detectable in the sphere of substantive law as
well. Then the paper focuses on the law of obligations, especially the contract
law (4) and the restitution law (5). Due to procedural reasons (“ubi remedium, ibi
ius” rule), the separate branches of law of obligations were founded in the closed
systems of nominate contracts, torts (6) and unjust factors leading to restitution
respectively. It is emphasized, however that these analogies should not be deemed
to be the examples of the reception of the Roman law by the English courts (7).

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Should we punish hate? Remarks about
the concept of hate crimes

In the face of growing interest in the concept of hate crimes in Poland, the aim
of this article is to present a few queries concerning this institution. Focusing
on the so-called “racial animus” model of hate crime legislation there are presented
main justifications of this concept (inter alia the so-called “greater harm
argument” and the so-called “greater culpability of hate argument”) and there
are discussed and developed various critical arguments referring to it. There is
also commented the recent attempt to reform the Polish Criminal Code. Authors
of the project explicitly refer to the concept of hate crimes. However, due to the
very narrow scope of the proposed amendment, one can make a statement that
the shape of planned changes corresponds to the widely shared understanding of
the concept of hate crimes only to an insignificant extent. Thus, it appears that
the project should not refer to the discussed institution at all. Due to a number
of important problems (philosophical, social, and related to legal dogmatics),
possible decisions to introduce hate crimes in legal system should be preceded
by an in-depth reflection. However, due to the described issues, one can venture
an assertion that this institution should not be introduced at all.

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Blanket criminal provisions as
a constitutional issue – summary

The article aims to answer the question whether and if yes, then under what conditions
blanket criminal provisions meet constitutional requirement of definiteness
of an offense. This question is one of the most important legal issues that arises
at the level of relations between the criminal law and the constitutional law.
The rulings of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal relating to this issue show a farreaching
evolution. This evolution has proceeded from the thesis on an absolute
prohibition of referrals in the criminal law towards the thesis on conditional permission
of using blanket provisions in the criminal law. In the currently established
judgments the Tribunal has stated that, from perspective of the constitutional
principle of definiteness of an offense, blanket provisions are admissible if they
meet the so-called foreseeability test. This test is met if the addressee of a criminal
provision is able to determine – merely from the wording of the provision – main
elements of the offense. It is worth noting that the Tribunal accepts both the partially
blanket provisions and in exceptional situations the fully blanket provisions.
The direction of changes in the judgments indicates a definitely needed pragmatism
in balancing between the protective and the guarantee functions of the
criminal law.

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Some observations on the “development
risk” in regulations concerning genetically
modified foods, new foods and dietary
supplements

Regulations concerning products such as genetically modified foods, new food
products or dietary supplements all have in common the one thing, namely: significant
difficulties (if not impossibility) in describing the safety of their use once
marketed. The EU legislator in each of these products has “created” a singular
“legislative safety standard” – considering the absence of any reliable factual
standard of safety. The domain of law and science touches both on substantive
as well as procedural law; the latter can significantly serve to precise the level of
risk connected with introducing a product on to the market and its monitoring.
This absence of a reliable factual safety standard results from a serious gap
in scientific knowledge or vague areas of the product qualification, which is
a consequence of the defective law. In many instances it is impossible for the
producer to cite the “development risk”. The legislative standard of safety,
within which there is no identification of factual risk, nor even any attempt
towards doing so – brings forth the question on the boundaries of legislative
experimenting. Discretion in such situations may prove to be a legislator’s virtue,
according to the old principle of primum non nocere.